A Haystack Full of Needles: Scalable Detection of IoT Devices in the
  Wild by Saidi, Said Jawad et al.
If you cite this paper, please use the IMC reference: Said Jawad Saidi, Anna Maria Mandalari, Roman Kolcun, Hamed Haddadi, Daniel J. Dubois, David Chones, Georgios
Smaragdakis, Anja Feldmann. 2020. A Haystack Full of Needles: Scalable Detection of IoT Devices in the Wild. In Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’20), October 27–29,
2020, Pisburgh, PA, USA. ACM, New York, NY, USA,
A Haystack Full of Needles:
Scalable Detection of IoT Devices in the Wild
Said Jawad Saidi
Max Planck Institute for Informatics
Anna Maria Mandalari
Imperial College London
Roman Kolcun
Imperial College London
Hamed Haddadi
Imperial College London
Daniel J. Dubois
Northeastern University
David Chones
Northeastern University
Georgios Smaragdakis
TU Berlin
Max Planck Institute for Informatics
Anja Feldmann
Max Planck Institute for
Informatics/Saarland University
ABSTRACT
Consumer Internet of ings (IoT) devices are extremely popular,
providing users with rich and diverse functionalities, from voice
assistants to home appliances. ese functionalities oen come with
signicant privacy and security risks, with notable recent large-
scale coordinated global aacks disrupting large service providers.
us, an important rst step to address these risks is to know what
IoT devices are where in a network. While some limited solutions
exist, a key question is whether device discovery can be done by
Internet service providers that only see sampled ow statistics. In
particular, it is challenging for an ISP to eciently and eectively
track and trace activity from IoT devices deployed by its millions
of subscribers—all with sampled network data.
In this paper, we develop and evaluate a scalable methodology
to accurately detect and monitor IoT devices at subscriber lines
with limited, highly sampled data in-the-wild. Our ndings in-
dicate that millions of IoT devices are detectable and identiable
within hours, both at a major ISP as well as an IXP, using passive,
sparsely sampled network ow headers. Our methodology is able
to detect devices from more than 77% of the studied IoT manufac-
turers, including popular devices such as smart speakers. While
our methodology is eective for providing network analytics, it
also highlights signicant privacy consequences.
CCS CONCEPTS
•Security and privacy→ Network security; •Networks→ Net-
work monitoring; Public Internet; Network measurement;
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1 INTRODUCTION
e number of IoT devices deployed within homes is increasing
rapidly. It is estimated that at the end of 2019, more than 9.5 billion
IoT devices were active, and the IoT population will increase to 20
billion by 2025 [1]. Such devices include virtual assistants, smart
home control, cameras, and smart TVs. While users deploy some
IoT devices explicitly, they are oen unaware of the security threats
and privacy consequences of using such devices [2]. Major Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) are developing strategies for dealing with
the large-scale coordinated aacks from these devices.
Existing solutions focus on instrumenting testbeds or home en-
vironments to collect and analyze full packet captures [3–5], local
search for IoT anomalies [6, 7], active measurements [8, 9], or
data from antivirus companies running scan campaigns from users
homes [7]. In isolation, these data sources do not provide enough
insights for preventing network-wide aacks from IoT devices [10].
Detecting IoT devices from an ISP can help to identify suspicious
trac and what devices are common among the subscriber lines
generating that trac.
In this paper, we present a methodology for detecting home
IoT devices in-the-wild at an ISP, and an Internet Exchange Point
(IXP), by relying on passive, sampled network traces and active
probing experiments. We build on the insight that IoT devices
typically rely on backend infrastructure hosted on the cloud to
oer their services. While contacting such infrastructure, they
expose information, including their trac destinations, even when
a device is not in use [4]. One of the challenges of detecting IoT
devices at scale is the poor availability and low granularity of data
sources. e available data is oen in the form of centrally-collected
aggregate and sampled data (e.g., NetFlow [11], IPFIX traces [12]).
us, we need a methodology that (a) does not rely on payload and
(b) handles sparsely sampled data.
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Another challenge is trac paerns diversity, across IoT devices
and their services.1 We note that some devices, e.g., cameras, will
generate signicant continuous trac; others, e.g., plugs, can be
expected to be mainly passive unless used. Moreover, many devices
oer the same service, e.g., the Alexa voice assistant [13] is available
on several brands of smart speakers as well as on Amazon Fire
TV devices. Here, the trac paerns may depend on the service
rather than the specic IoT device. Some services rely on dedicated
backend infrastructures, while others may use shared ones, e.g.,
CDNs. us, we need a methodology that identies which IoT
services are detectable from the trac and then identies a unique
trac paern for each IoT device and associated services.
Our key insight is that we can address these challenges by fo-
cusing our analysis only on the types of destinations contacted by
IoT devices. Even with sparsely sampled data, the set of servers
contacted by an IoT device over time can form a reasonably unique
signature that is revealed in as lile as a few hours. However, this
approach has limitations, for example we cannot use it to detect
devices or services that use a shared infrastructure with unrelated
services (e.g., CDNs).
To understand the detectability of IoT devices in the above-
mentioned environment, we focus on the possible communication
paerns of end-user IoT services and the types of destinations they
contact. Figure 1 shows three possible communication paerns on
top of a typical network topology. is includes three households,
an ISP, as well as a dedicated infrastructure and a CDN that hosts
multiple servers. Device A is deployed by two subscribers, and only
contacts one server in the dedicated infrastructure. Device B is de-
ployed by a single subscriber and contacts both a dedicated server,
as well as a CDN server. Device C is deployed by two subscribers
and contacts only CDN servers. We observe that, using NetFlow
traces at the ISP edge, it is possible to identify subscriber lines
hosting devices of type A and B. Devices of type C are harder to
detect given the sampling rates and header-only nature of NetFlow.
In this paper, we use a unique testbed and dataset to build a
methodology for detecting and monitoring IoT devices at scale (see
Figure 2). We rst use controlled experiments, where we tunnel
the trac of two IoT testbeds with 96 IoT devices to an ISP. is
provides us with ground truth IoT trac within this ISP (Section 2).
We conrm the visibility of the ground truth IoT trac using the
NetFlow ISP data (Section 3). Next, we identify backend infras-
tructures for many IoT services, from the observed ISP IoT trac
(Section 4). We augment this base information with data from DNS
queries, web certicates, and banners. Next, we use the trac sig-
natures to identify broadband subscriber lines using IoT services
at the ISP, as well as an IXP (Section 6). Finally, we discuss our
results, their signicance, and limitations in Section 7, related work
(Section 8), and conclude with a summary in Section 9.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We develop a methodology for identifying IoT devices, by classi-
fying domains and IP addresses of the backend infrastructure. To
this end we derive distinct signatures, in terms of IP/domain/port
destinations, to recognize IoT devices. With our signatures we
1Here we refer to IoT services as the set of protocols and destinations that are part of
the operations of an IoT device.
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Figure 1: Simplied IoT communication patterns at the network
edge
were able to recognize the presence of devices from 31 out of 40
manufacturers in our testbed.
• We show that it is possible to detect the presence of IoT devices
at subscriber lines, using sparsely sampled ow captures from a
large residential ISP, and a major IXP, even if the device is idle,
i.e., not in active use. Specically, we were able to recognize
that 20% of 15 million subscriber lines used at least one of the 56
dierent IoT products in our testbed.
• We highlight that our technique scales, is accurate, and can
identify millions of IoT devices within minutes, in a non-intrusive
way from passive, sampled data. In the case of the ISP, we were
able to detect the presence of devices from 72% of our target
manufacturers within 1 hour, sometimes minutes.
Based on our ndings, we also discuss why some IoT devices are
faster to detect, how to hide an IoT service, as well as how the
detectability can be used to improve IoT services and network
troubleshooting.
2 IOT – CONTROLLED EXPERIMENTS
We need ground truth trac from IoT devices, as observed both in a
testbed and in the wild, for developing and testing our methodology.
In this section, we describe our data collection strategy (see point
1 of Figure 2).
2.1 Network Setting
We utilize two vantage points, namely a large European ISP, and a
major European IXP.
ISP (ISP-VP). e ISP is a large residential ISP that oers Internet
services to over 15 million broadband subscriber lines. e ISP
uses NetFlow [11] to monitor the trac ows at all border routers
in its network, using a consistent sampling rate across all routers.
Figure 3 shows where NetFlow data is collected.
IXP (IXP-VP). e IXP facilitates trac exchange between its
members. At this point, it has more than 800 members, including
international, with peak trac exceeding 8 Tbps. e IXP uses
IPFIX [12] to collect trac data across its switching fabric at a
consistent sampling rate, which is an order of magnitude lower
than the one used at the ISP. Figure 4 illustrates where the IPFIX
data is collected.
A Haystack Full of Needles IMC ’20, October 27–29, 2020, Pisburgh, PA, USA
ISP
2 23 3
32
2
4 4
4
4
5 5
5
55
5
1 Generate and capture ground truth (GT) IoT traffic in the labs and household - Section 2
2 Capture GT traffic in ISP Vantage pointEvaluate visibility of GT IoT traffic in the ISP-VP - Section 3
3 Identify IoT domains, service IPs , and port numbers, generate detection rules - Section 4    
4
Detect IoT devices in the wild - Section 65
Cross check detection rules by inferring devices on GT data - 
Section 5 
Home w/ 
IoT Devices
1
Figure 2: General methodology overview.
Border Router
BNG Router
Border Router
Home 
Vantage Point
Border Router
Testbed 1 w/
 IoT Devices
Testbed 2 w/
 IoT Devices
BNG Router
IoT Traffic 
through VPN
Device A
 IoT Service Flow 
Device B
 IoT Service Flow 
Device C
 IoT Service Flow 
Packet Capture Point
Flow Capture Point
BNG Router Border Router
Figure 3: ISP setup
& ow collection points
Device A
 IoT Service Flow 
Device B
 IoT Service Flow 
Flow Capture Point
IXP Member
Figure 4: IXP setup
& ow collection points
Ethical considerations ISP/IXP. Neither the ISP nor the IXP ow
data contain any payload data, thus no user information. We distin-
guish user IPs from server IPs and anonymize by hashing all user
IPs. We call an IP a server IP if it receives or transmits trac on
well-known ports or if it belongs to ASes of cloud or CDN providers.
e ports include, e.g., web ports (80, 443, 8080), NTP (123), DNS
(53). Moreover, we do not have any specic user activity and can
only access and report aggregated statistics in accordance with the
policies of the ISP and IXP.
Subscriber line (Home-VP) Network setup. In order to ingest
ground truth trac into the network, we need privileged access to
a home subscriber line. For this, we use the ISP-VP, but rather than
deploying all IoT devices directly within the home, we placed a
VPN endpoint with an IP out of the /28 subscriber’s prex and used
it to ingest IoT trac tunneled to the server from two IoT testbeds,
one in Europe, one in the US, see Figure 3. e measurement points
within the ISP will also capture this trac. We simply excluded this
trac from our dataset, as the VPN tunnel endpoints are known
to us and for each experiment we use the default DNS server for
the ISP. Importantly, since the /28 prex is used explicitly for our
experiments, there was no other network activity other than that
of the IoT devices.
Ethical considerations–Home-VP setting. With the coopera-
tion of the ISP, we were able to use a reserved /28 allocated to this
specic subscriber line (Home-VP) (with signed explicit consent)
out of a /22 prex reserved for residential users. us, the analysis
in this paper only considers trac explicitly ingested by the ground
truth experiments and does not involve any user-generated trac.
2.2 Ground Truth Trac Setting
e IoT testbeds used here consist of 96 devices from 40 vendors.
We selected the devices to provide diversity within and between
dierent categories: surveillance, smart hubs, home automation,
video, audio, and appliances. Most of these are among the most
popular devices, according to Amazon, in their respective region.
Our testbed includes multiple instances of the same device (56
dierent products), so that we can see the destinations that each
product contacts in dierent locations. For a list of the IoT devices
and the category of each device, we refer to Table 1. We redirect all
Category Device Name
Surveillance Amcrest Cam, Blink Cam, Blink Hub, Icsee Doorbell, Lefun Cam, Luohe Cam,
Microseven Cam, Reolink Cam, Ring Doorbell, Ubell Doorbell, Wansview Cam,
Yi Cam, ZModo Doorbell
Smart Hubs Insteon, Lightify, Philips Hue, Sengled, Smarhings, SwitchBot, Wink 2, Xiaomi
Home Automation D-Link Mov Sensor, Flux Bulb, Honeywell T-stat, Magichome Strip, Meross Door
Opener, Nest T-stat, Philips Bulb, Smartlife Bulb, Smartlife Remote, TP-Link Bulb,
TP-Link Plug, WeMo Plug, Xiaomi Strip, Xiaomi Plug
Video Apple TV, Fire TV, LG TV, Roku TV, Samsung TV
Audio Allure with Alexa, Echo Dot, Echo Spot, Echo Plus, Google Home Mini,
Google Home
Appliances Anova Sousvide, Appkele, GE Microwave, Netatmo Weather, Samsung Dryer
(idle), Samsung Fridge (idle), Smarter Brewer, Smarter Coee Machine,
Smarter iKele, Xiaomi Rice Cooker
Table 1: IoT devices under test. idle indicates that we capture the
trac just for idle periods because the experiments could not be
automated.
IoT trac to the Home-VP within the ISP, and we capture all the
trac generated by the IoT devices (see 1 in Figure 2).
Most of the selected IoT devices are controlled using either a
voice interface provided by a voice assistant (such as Amazon Alexa)
or via a smartphone companion application. We use the voice inter-
face to automate active experiments by producing voice commands
using a Google Voice synthesizer. For IoT devices that support a
companion app, we use Android smartphones, and we rely on the
Monkey Application Exerciser for Android Studio [14] for automat-
ing simulated interactions between the user and the IoT device.
2.3 Active and Idle IoT Experiments
Our experiments can be classied into idle and active experiments.
Idle experiments. We dene as idle the experiments during which
the devices are just connected to the Internet without being actively
used. We generate idle trac for three days (November 23th-25th,
2019) from both testbeds.
Active experiments. We dene as active the experiments involv-
ing automated interactions. We perform two types of automated
interactions, each one repeated multiple times: (i) power interac-
tions, since in a previous study [4] it was reported that many IoT
devices generate signicant trac when they are powered o and
on. We manage the power status of the devices through several
TP-Link smart plugs that we can control programmatically, fol-
lowed by two minutes of trac capture; (ii) functional interactions,
by automatically controlling the main functionality of the devices
(i.e., the act of switching on/o the light for a smart bulb) via voice
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(either directly or through a smart speaker) or via a companion app
running on a separate network with respect to the IoT device (to
force the communication to happen over the Internet rather than
locally). Unfortunately, some interactions for some devices cannot
easily be automated (devices with idle in Table 1). For these devices,
we consider only idle experiments. In total, we perform 9,810 active
experiments between November 15th and 18th, 2019.
3 IOT TRAFFIC – VISIBILITY
In this section, we aim to understand (i) to which extent the IoT
related trac of a single subscriber line reaches a diverse set of
servers in the Internet, and (ii) whether the low sampling rate of
NetFlow limits the subscriber/device visibility. For this, we rely
on the ground truth trac for the Home-VP. More specically, we
monitor the IoT trac at both vantage points: the Home-VP, as well
as the border routers of the ISP-VP (see 1 and 2 of Figure 2).
We rst focus on the number of IP addresses that are contacted
in each hour during the idle and the active experiments by the
IoT devices, as stated in Section 2.3. We explicitly exclude DNS
trac, since it is not IoT-specic. From Figure 5(a), we see that
during the active experiments, the IoT devices contact between 500
and 1,300 service IPs per hour when monitored at the Home-VP.
Due to sampling, not all of this trac is visible at the ISP-VP. We
dene service IPs as the sets of IPs associated with the backend
infrastructures that support the IoT services. Indeed, the number of
observed service IPs per hour in the ISP-VP decreases to an average
of 16%. Overall, during our idle experiments, the total number
of contacted service IPs is lower, but the average percentage of
observed service IPs remained at 16.5%.
e spikes in the active experiments are partially due to power
and the functional interactions. is can be seen on the idle experi-
ments, where the spike indicates the action of starting the device
(only at the beginning). Note that these spikes are also visible in
the sampled ISP NetFlow data.
At rst glance, 16% sounds like a very small percentage. However,
we note that the visibility of popular service IPs is signicantly
high. Figure 6 shows the fraction of service IPs that are visible for
the servers contacted the most, according to byte count. For the
top 10% of the service IPs, more than 75% are visible, rising up to
90% during some experiments. For less popular service IPs, e.g., the
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top 20% and top 30%, the visibility is only reduced to 70% and 60%
in the active experiment, and a bit lower for the idle experiment.
If we consider the entire period of our experiments, the percent-
age of visible service IPs is more than 34% and 28% for idle and
active experiments. Overall, at the daily level, more than 95% of
service IPs are visible for the top 20%. Although we cannot observe
all IoT devices activity at the ISP-VP, a signicant subset is visible.
While any specic service IP may not maer that much for an
IoT service, its communications with a server domain name that
may be hosted on multiple service IPs is essential. From the Home-
VP, we know which service IPs correspond to which domain. us,
we can determine which observed service IPs at the ISP-VP belong
to which domain. is information is relevant for our methodology
because in the ISP NetFlow data only IPs are visible. Figure 5(b)
shows the number of observed domains(FQDNs) at the Home-VP
and the ISP-VP. Many domains are hosted at multiple service IPs,
hence we see that the number of observed service IPs is higher than
the number of observed domains.
Figure 5(d) shows the number of observed IoT devices per hour
from the ground truth IoT trac. We observe a device when at least
one packet from that device is seen within an hour timebin. Note,
in active experiments the experiments on devices from Testbed1
(see gure 3), are started aer Testbed2. erefore, all devices are
not active during the same period. e the average percentages of
devices visible at ISP-VP,in active and idle experiments are 67% and
64% respectively.
Next, we separate the observable network activity by ports. More
specically, we consider Web Services (ports 443, 80, 8080), NTP
services (port 123), and other services (the rest of the ports), and
we show the cumulative number of service IPs contacted. e
resulting plot, Figure 5(c), shows that (i) the trend of observable
service IPs at the Home-VP is mirrored at the ISP-VP, even when
dierent services are considered, and (ii) the number of service IPs
converges over time.
We also checked if any of the trac from the Home-VP is visible
at the IXP. However, neither during the active, nor during the idle
experiments, we observe trac at the IXP. is is expected as the
ISP is not a member of the IXP. Rather it peers directly (via private
interconnects) with a large number of content and cloud providers
as well as other networks.
In summary, our analysis of the ground truth IoT trac shows
that, despite the low sampling of NetFlow, popular domains, service
IPs, and ports of a single subscriber line (the Home-VP) are visible
at the ISP.
4 IOT DEVICE DETECTION METHODOLOGY
In this section, we outline our methodology for the detection of IoT
devices in-the-wild. IoT services typically rely on a backend support
infrastructure (see Figure 1) for user interactions. From our ground
truth experiments, we noticed that this backend infrastructure is
oen also used for keep-alives, heartbeats, updates, maintenance,
storage, and synchronization. is observation is consistent with
previous works [4, 15].
We focus on identifying which Internet backend infrastructure is
supporting each of the IoT devices that we deployed in our testbeds
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Figure 7: IoT Trac detection methodology overview.
(see 3 in Figure 2). When we refer to Internet backend infrastruc-
ture, we use two dierent abstractions: (i) sets of IP addresses/ports
combinations as observable from the Internet vantage points, and
(ii) sets of DNS domains. We focus also on domains because they
are the primary indirect way for the devices to access their backend
infrastructure. While domain names are typically part of the per-
manent programming of the devices, IP addresses are discovered
during DNS resolution, and may change over time.
A naive approach for identifying the backend infrastructure
would be to use the ground truth trac to identify which domains,
and as a consequence, which service IPs are being contacted by each
device. However this is not sucient for the following reasons:
Limited relevance of some domains: Not all domains are es-
sential to support the services, or are useful for classication; for
example, some domains may be used for advertisements or generic
services, e.g., time.microsoft.com or wikipedia.org, see Sec-
tion 4.1.
Limited visibility of IP addresses: Since the ground truth data
is captured at a single subscriber line only and DNS to IP mapping
is rather dynamic, just looking at this trac is not sucient, see
Section 4.2.1.
Usage of shared infrastructure: Not all IoT services are sup-
ported by a dedicated backend infrastructure. Some rely on shared
ones, such as CDNs. In the former case they can still have dedicated
IP addresses; in the laer cases they use shared IP addresses, see
Section 4.2.1.
Churn: DNS domain to IP address mappings are dynamic, see
Section 4.2.1.
Common programming APIs: Multiple IoT services may use
the same common programming API or may be used by dierent
manufacturers; as a result, they oen rely on the same infrastruc-
ture. is is the case for relatively generic IoT services such as
Alexa voice service. While this IoT service is available on ded-
icated devices, e.g., Amazon Echo, it can also be integrated into
third-party hardware, e.g., fridges and alarm clocks [13]. We cannot
easily distinguish these from network trac observations.
Below we tackle these challenges one by one. e outcome is an
IoT dictionary that contains mappings for individual IoT services
to sets of domains, IP addresses, and ports. Based on IoT services,
we generate rules for IoT device detection. For an overview of the
resulting methodology, see Figure 7.
4.1 Classifying IoT Domains
e amount and frequency of network trac that an IoT device
exchanges with its backend infrastructure varies from device to
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Figure 8: Home-VP: Circular bar plot of average # of packets/hour
per domain (log y-scale). e domains belong to 13 IoT devices and
separated into three groups: one for laconic and two for gossiping
devices (Echo Dot and Apple TV).
device, depending on the complexity of its services, its implemen-
tation specics, and the usage of the device. is is highlighted in
Figure 8, where we show the average number of packets per device
and per domain (using a log y-scale) for 13 dierent devices (subset
of devices) in their idle mode. e rst observation is that most
devices are supported by their own set of domains and for many
IoT services, this is a small set containing less than 10 domains. We
refer to these as small domain sets as they correspond to laconic
devices. Other devices gossip and have sizable domain sets. Figure 8
shows the domains of two example gossip devices (Apple TV in
gray and Echo Dot in orange) and several laconic devices (rest of
the colors).
Having a sizable domain set oen indicates the usage of a larger
infrastructure, which may not be dedicated to a specic IoT ser-
vice. We nd that most of these domains are mapped via CNAMEs
to other domains. For the two gossiping examples considered in
Figure 8, the domains of Echo Dot are mostly mapped to its own
infrastructure. However, the ones of Apple TV are mainly mapped
to a CDN—in this case, Akamai—that oers a variety of services.
Based on these observations from our ground truth data, we classify
the domains as follows:
IoT-Specic domains. Grouped into (i) Primary domains: reg-
istered to an IoT device manufacturer or an IoT service operator;
and (ii) Support domains: that are not necessarily registered to IoT
device manufacturers or service operators, but oering complemen-
tary services for IoT devices, i.e., samsung-*.whisk.com for Samsung
Fridges, here whisk.com is a service that provides food recipes and
images of food.
Generic domains. Domains registered to generic service providers
that are heavily used by non-IoT devices as well, e.g., netix.com,
wikipedia.org, and public NTP servers.
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Figure 9: Home-VP: ECDF of average # of packets/hour for all IoT-
Specic domains, per device, (idle and active experiments).
We classify each domain name from our idle and active experi-
ments using paern matching, manual inspection, and by visiting
their websites and those of the device manufacturers. Since the
Generic domains cover non-IoT trac, we do not further consider
them. Rather, we focus on the IoT-Specic domains. As a result, we
classify 415 out of the 524 domains as Primary and 19 as Support
domains.
Next, we explore the volume of trac that the IoT devices ex-
change with all domains. Figure 9 shows the ECDF of the average
number of packets per hour per domain for all IoT-Specic domains
for both the idle and the active experiments. First, we note that
almost all devices and domains are exchanging at least 100 packets
per hour, and this may not suce for detecting them in any given
hour in the wild due to sampling. However, during the active exper-
iments, we see that some domains are only used when the device
is active or other domains receive signicantly more trac, up to
and exceeding 10K packets, which may suce for detection. ese
laer domains may be ideal candidates for detecting such devices
in the wild.
4.2 Identifying Dedicated Infrastructures
Once we have a list of IoT-Specic domains(FQDNs) with their
associated service IP addresses and port mappings from the ground
truth experiments, we need to understand whether they have a
shared or dedicated backend infrastructure. e reason is that, if
we want to identify IoT services and consequently IoT devices in
the wild by using network traces such as NetFlow, we can only
observe standard network level features such as src/dst IP and port
numbers without packet payload. erefore, if a service IP belongs
to a shared infrastructure such as a CDN or a generic web hosting
service, this service IP can serve many domains, and it is impossible
for us to exactly know which domain was actually contacted. To
this end, the purpose of this section is two-fold. First, to expand the
candidate service IPs beyond those directly observed in the ground
truth experiments (to mitigate that we are focusing on a single
subscriber line). Second, to classify domains into those that use
backend services hosted on dedicated infrastructure service IPs vs.
those that rely on shared infrastructure service IPs. We do this by
relying on DNSDB [16], Censys [9], and applying additional lters.
4.2.1 From IoT-Specific Domains to Service IPs: DNSDB. We use
IoT-Specic domains to identify the backend infrastructure that
is hosting them. To this end, we leverage the technique in [17],
and use these domain names to identify all associated service IPs
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on which these domains are hosted during the time period of our
experiments. We use both the ground truth experiments, and ex-
ternal DNS databases, including DNSDB [18]. We found that the
specic IP addresses mapping to specic domains can change oen.
However, DNSDB provides information for all domains served by
an IP address in a given time period and vice versa, hence it mit-
igates the issues caused by this churn. DNSDB also provides all
records, including CNAMEs that may have been returned in the
DNS response, for a given domain. us, we use DNSDB to check
if a service IP address is exclusively used for a specic IoT service,
or if it hosts additional domains. We say a service IP is exclusively
used if it only serves domains from a single “second-level” domain
(SLD) and its CNAMEs. However, we note that the CNAMEs may
not involve the same second-level domain. Let us consider an exam-
ple: the domain devA.com is mapped via a chain of CNAMEs such
as devA-VM.ec2compute.amazonaws.com to IP a.b.c.d. is IP
only reverse maps to devA-VM.ec2compute.amazonaws.com and
its associated CNAME devA.com. Since this is the only CNAME
associated with the IP, we may consider this IP a direct mapping
for the domain. Yet, at the same time, we nd support that public
IP addresses assigned to a cloud resource such as a virtual machine
in AWS EC2, that is occupied by a tenant, is not shared with other
tenants unless the current resource is released. is is a popular ser-
vice oered by multiple platforms [19–21]. Let us consider a second
example: domain devB.com. It may use the Akamai CDN. us, the
domain devB.com is a CNAME for devB.com.akadns.net. is
domain then maps to IP a.b.c.d. However, in this case, many
other domains, e.g., anothersite.com.akadns.net, also map to
this IP. us, we may conclude that this domain is hosted on a
shared infrastructure.
Once we understand if an IP is exclusively used for a specic IoT
service, we can also classify the domains as either using a dedicated
or shared infrastructure. For the former, all service IPs have to be
dedicated to this domain for all days, otherwise we presume that
the domain relies on a shared infrastructure. Once we apply this
methodology to all 434 domain names, we nd that 217 are hosted
on dedicated service IPs, while 202 are relying on a shared backend
infrastructure. For 15 of the domains we did not have sucient
information in DNSDB. We handle them in the next step.
4.2.2 From IoT-Specific Domains to Service IPs: Censys. Among
the reasons that DNSDB may not suce for mapping some domains
to service IPs is that (a) frequent remapping of domains to IPs or, (b)
missing data since the requests for the domains may not have been
recorded by DNSDB, which intercepts requests for a subset of the
DNS hierarchy. To overcome this limitation, we rely on the certi-
cate and banner datasets from Censys [9], to infer the ownership of
the domains and the corresponding IPs, as long as these are using
HTTPS. For example, we did not nd any record for the domain
c.devE.com in the DNSDB dataset. We then check if device E uses
HTTPS to communicate with this domain. is allows us to query
for all service IPs that potentially oer the same web certicate as
the hosts in this domain. For a certicate to be associated with a
domain, we require that the domain name and the Name eld entry
in the certicate match at least the SLD or higher, i.e. the Name eld
of the certicates matches the paern c.devE.com or *.devE.com
and that there is no other Subject Alternative Name (SAN) in the
certicate. Next, we query the Censys dataset for all IPs with the
same certicate and HTTPS banner checksum for the domain from
our ground truth dataset within the same period. is allows us
to identify data for 8 out of 15 of the domains which belong to 5
devices.
4.2.3 Removal of Shared IoT Backend Infrastructures. In the last
step of our methodology we lter out devices that use shared back-
end infrastructures. We nd that Google Home, Google Home Mini,
Apple TV, and Lefun camera, all have a shared backend infrastruc-
ture. For LG TV, we are le with only one out of 4 domains; for
Wemo Plug and Wink-hub, we could not identify sucient informa-
tion. Because of this, we have excluded these devices from further
consideration.
e result forms our daily list of dedicated IoT services, along
with their associated domains, service IPs and port combinations.
4.3 IoT Services to Device Detection Rules
Once we identied the set of IoT services that can be monitored,
we generate the rules for detecting IoT devices. Depending on the
set of IoT services contacted by the devices we can generate device
detection rules at three granularity levels: (i) Platform-level, (ii)
Manufacturer-level, and (iii) Product-level, from the most coarse-
grained to the most ne-grained, respectively. In this section, rst,
we show how we determine the detection level for each device.
en, we explain how we generate the detection rules for each IoT
device for the detection level that can be supported.
4.3.1 Determining IoT Detection Level.
Platform-level: Some manufacturers use o-the-shelf rmware,
or outsource their backend infrastructure to IoT platform solu-
tion companies such as Tuya [22], electricimp [23], AWS IoT Plat-
form [24]. ese IoT platforms can have several customers/manufacturers
that rely on their infrastructure. erefore, we may not be able to
distinguish between dierent manufacturers from their network
trac.
Manufacturer-level: e majority of our studied IoT services
rely on dedicated backend infrastructures that are operated by the
manufacturers themselves. We also observe that many manufac-
turers rely on similar APIs and backend infrastructures to support
their dierent products and services. is makes distinguishing
individual IoT products from their network trac more challenging.
Product-level: is is the most ne-grained detection level, where
we are able to distinguish between dierent products of a man-
ufacturer, e.g., Samsung TV, or Amazon Echo vs. Amazon Fire
TV. For detection at the product level, we underline the impor-
tance of side information about the purpose associated with a do-
main. With this information, we can improve our classication
accuracy. For example, for Alexa Enabled devices, the domain
avs-alexa.*.amazon.com is critical, as it is the base URL for the
Alexa Voice Service API [13] (shown in Figure 8 as amazon do-
main23). Other examples are the Samsung devices that use the
domain samsungotn.net to check for rmware updates [25].
Additionally, some advanced services of the devices oen require
additional backend support from manufacturers. ese may then
contact additional domains. By considering more specic features
(domains), the capabilities to distinguish products increases. We
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leverage these specialized features e.g., to distinguish Amazon Fire
TV, which contacts signicantly more domains than other Amazon
products, e.g., Echo Dot.
4.3.2 Generation of Detection Rules. For any of our three lev-
els of detection, we require that a subscriber contacts at least one
IP/port combination associated with a Primary domain of the IoT
service, to claim detectability of IoT activity at the subscriber. How-
ever, if there are many domains, requiring only one such activity
may not have enough evidence. For example, by monitoring a
single domain we can detect all Alexa Enabled devices, but this
service can be integrated into third party hardware as well. ere-
fore, in order to detect products manufactured by Amazon, e.g.,
Amazon Echo, it is essential to monitor additional domains that are
contacted by the Amazon Echo devices. For this, we introduce the
detection threshold D. If an IoT service has N IoT-Specic domains,
we require to observe trac involving k IP/port combinations that
are associated with max(1, bD × N c) of the N domains. To deter-
mine an appropriate value for this threshold, we rely on our ground
truth dataset, see Section 5.
We start with 96 devices in our testbeds. We have multiple copies
of a same device deployed in dierent continents. is reduces the
set of devices to 56 unique products. Of these, many are from the
same manufacturer, e.g., a Xiaomi rice cooker, a Xiaomi plug, and
a Xiaomi light bulb. Since these devices are oen supported by
the same backend infrastructure of the manufacturer, the list of
domains has signicant overlap and oen fully overlaps. In our
methodology we can detect 3 dierent IoT platforms, the coarsest
level, as 4 of our products rely on them. Moreover, we generated
rules for the detection of 29 IoT devices at the manufacturer level.
We had a diverse range of products from Amazon and Samsung
in our testbed that allowed us an in-depth analysis, and cross-
examination of domains contacted by dierent products. erefore,
for devices using Alexa voice service (i.e., Alexa Enabled), and for
Samsung IoT devices, we detect the former at the platform level
and the laer at the manufacturer level. For Alexa Enabled and
Samsung IoT devices, we compared the domains across dierent
devices and obtained enough side information about the purpose
of their domains that allowed us to further divide each of them into
two subclasses at more ne grained levels. For this, we dened
a hierarchy, namely Amazon products, and Fire TV, under Alexa
Enabled devices. Amazon products are detected at manufacturer
level, and include products such as Amazon Echo family and is
superclass of Fire TV. We identied 33 additional domains, besides
the Alexa voice service domain, that were contacted by Amazon
products. Moreover, Fire TV contacts up to 67 domains (34 more
domains than Amazon products). is allows us to establish its
subclass, at product level, under Amazon products. Using side
information [25] and comparing the set of domains across dierent
Samsung products, we monitor 14 domains in total, but only one
domain is important to detect Samsung IoT devices with Samsung
rmware (these include a broad range of products, such as fridges,
washing machines and TVs). Samsung TVs contact 16 additional
domains that are not used by any of the other Samsung devices in
our testbed.
Using the above methodology, we generated rules for the detec-
tion of 20 manufacturers, and 11 products that amounts to the 77%
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Figure 10: Home-VP: Time to detect IoT (per threshold).
of manufacturers in our testbeds. We generate rules for 3 unique
IoT platforms by monitoring 1 to 4 domains. Finally, for 11 products
by monitoring we consider between 1 to 67 domains. For a detailed
number of domains per IoT device see Figure10.
5 METHODOLOGY: CROSSCHECK
We use our ground truth dataset to check how long it takes for our
methodology (applied to the sampled ow data from the ISP) to
detect the presence of the IoT devices for the idle and the active
experiments (see 4 of Figure 2). For this, we report the time that
it takes to detect an IoT device that is hosted in our ground truth
subscriber line when it is in active mode (Figure 10 le) and idle
mode (Figure 10 right). We only include the ones that are detectable
with our methodology, i.e., those that do not rely exclusively on
shared infrastructures. We also annotate the device name with its
detection levels: Platform (Pl.), Manufacturer (Man.), and Product
level (Pr.). On average, by requiring the evidence of at least 40% of
domains, we are able to detect 72/93/96% of IoT devices that are
detectable at manufacturer or product level within 1/24/72 hours
in the active mode. Even in idle mode their the percentage is
40/73/76% with 1/24/72 hours. For the devices detectable only at
product level(Pr.), with the same required evidence, we detected
63/81/90% of them within the 1/24/72 hours respectively, in active
mode. Indeed, popular products such as Amazon products (i.e.,
Echo Dot, Echo Spot) can be almost instantly detected. is is a
signicant nding and underlines that it is possible to use sampled
ow data within an ISP to accurately detect the presence of a specic
IoT product within a subscriber line, despite dierences in activity
and IP churn due to operational requirements.
A closer look reveals that, in general, it takes longer to detect
an idle IoT device in comparison to when it is active. is is not
surprising, as most IoT devices show more network activity in
active mode. However, this does not mean that the increase will
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Figure 11: ISP: Per Hour, Subscriber lines with IoT activity (Alexa Enabled, Samsung IoT, and others).
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Figure 12: ISP: Drill down forAmazon and Samsung IoT devices–per
day.
occur across all of the services contacted by a device, since there
are exceptions that take longer to detect even in active mode, e.g.,
SmartLife, and Nest.
Figure 10 also contains information regarding the number of
monitored domains per IoT device with their detection level. For
9 IoT devices, a single domain is considered. For the others, we
consider many more (up to 67). A threshold determines the fraction
of domains for which we require evidence of network trac to
claim detection. To understand the impact of such threshold on
detection time, we variate its value from 0.1 to 1 and show the
corresponding detection times. Note, for IoT devices where we
consider only one domain, the variation of the threshold does not
change the detection time, as we always require evidence of at
least one domain. Overall, we note that a larger threshold can
increase the detection time, and some IoT devices may no longer be
detectable. However, it may also increase the false positive rate. We
crosscheck possible false positives by running another experiment
where we only enable a small subset of IoT devices. We then apply
our detection methodology to these traces and do not identify any
devices that are not explicitly part of the experiment. We also try
to avoid false positives by ensuring that the domain sets per device
dier.
Regarding detectability, we notice that 6 IoT devices could not be
detected even aer the entire duration of our idle experiments. A
closer investigation shows that for 5 of these, the frequency of trac
is so small that their likelihood of detection is very low. Indeed,
for this specic time period, they were invisible in the NetFlow
data. For Samsung TV, we require to observe enough domains
to conrm the presence of a Samsung IoT device, before moving
forward with detection. us, if we do not see enough Samsung
IoT domains, then we do not claim the detection of Samsung TVs.
Nevertheless, the results look very promising for us to aempt on
detecting deployed IoT devices in the wild.
6 RESULTS: IOT IN THEWILD
In this section, we apply our methodology for detecting IoT activity
in the ISP and IXP data (see 5 in Figure 2). For this we focus
on the two weeks in which we collected the data from the ground
truth experiments to obtain up-to-date mappings of domains to IPs.
6.1 Ethical Considerations and Privacy
Implications
Applying our methodology to trac data from ISPs and IXPs may
raise ethical concerns as it may be considered as analyzing customer
activities. However, this is not the goal of this paper. e goal here
is to showcase that it is possible to detect and map the penetration of
IoT device usage. As such, this study is not about subscribers’ device
activities, instead it is about detection capabilities and aggregated
usage. us, we report on percentages of subscriber lines where we
can observe IoT related activity. Indeed, we are unable to trace IoT
activity back to individuals as the raw data was anonymized as per
recommendations by [5] and never le our collaborators’ premises.
6.2 Vantage Point: ISP
IoT related activity in-the-wild. Figure 11 shows the number
of ISP subscriber lines for which we detect IoT related activity.
Figure 11(a) and Figure 11(b) focus on hourly and daily summaries.
Since the top IoT devices detected are Alexa Enabled and Samsung
IoT, we show them separately.
We see IoT related activity for roughly 20% of the subscriber
lines. Our results show a signicant penetration of Alexa Enabled
devices of roughly 14%. is is slightly more than estimates of
national surveys in the country where the ISP operates, stating
that the market penetration of Alexa Enabled devices, as of June
2019, is around 12% [26–28]. Yet, these reports cannot capture
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Figure 13: ISP: Cumulative # of subscriber lines resp. /24s with daily
IoT activity across two weeks.
which devices are in active use at any particular day, e.g., Nov. 2019,
contrary to our study.
Daily patterns of IoT related activity. By looking at the hourly
plots in Figure 11(a), we see some signicant daily paerns for
Alexa Enabled and Samsung IoT devices. We do not see diurnal
paerns for the other 32 IoT device types. Such diurnal paerns
are correlated with human activities. Typically, during the day,
network activity increases as the users interact with the IoT devices
while it decreases during the night when the devices are idle. As
detection likelihood is correlated with network activity, the devices
detectability also correlates with this diurnal paern. We note
that the paerns for Alexa Enabled does not dier from those for
Samsung. e reason is that many of the Alexa Enabled and Sam-
sung IoT (Samsung TVs) class may be used more for entertainment,
which is why their activity is higher in the evenings. Samsung
IoT devices have a small spike in the mornings before gradually
reaching their peak around 18:00 (ISP timezone). For the drill down
for Samsung IoT devices see Figure 12. Even with the presence of a
diurnal variation for Alexa Enabled, there is a signicant baseline
during the night. is is expected as IoT devices oen have trac
even when they are idle and are thus detectable. Over the course
of a day, the diurnal variation is rather low compared with the
typical network activity driven by human activity. is explains
the low variance of the observed number of subscriber lines for
Alexa Enabled devices.
Aggregation per day. We observed in Section 5 that, while it
is oen possible to detect Alexa Enabled devices within an hour,
the same is not always true for Samsung IoT devices. erefore,
Figure 11(b) reports the same data but this time using an aggrega-
tion period of a day.2 We see that the total number of observed
subscriber lines does not change drastically from day to day. How-
ever, we also note that the number of subscriber lines with Alexa
Enabled devices roughly doubled, while those with Samsung in-
creased by a factor of 6. e reason is that detecting Samsung
2Most subscriber lines are not subject to new address assignments within a day. Most
addresses remain stable as the ISP oers VoIP services.
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Figure 14: ISP: Drill down of IoT activity for 32 dierent IoT device
types with their popularity in the ISPs country.
IoT devices is more challenging because they are contacting their
Primary domain less frequently than Alexa Enabled devices. us,
their detection is heavily helped by the increase in the observation
time period. For the other IoT devices we see these eects, whereby
the increase is correlated to the expected time for detection. Note,
certain Samsung domains are contacted by both Samsung IoT and
Non-IoT devices. In our analysis, we only consider domains that
are exclusively contacted by Samsung IoT devices. By adding those
domains, the number of detected Samsung devices will be increased
at least by a factor of two, but this also adds false positives to our
results.
Detecting specic devices. So far, we have focused on the su-
perclass of Alexa Enabled and Samsung IoT devices. However, by
adding more specialized features, our methodology allows us to
further dierentiate them. For example, some subsets of domains
are only contacted by specic products. us, in Figure 12 we
show which fraction of the Alexa Enabled IoT devices are con-
rmed Amazon products and which fraction of these are Fire TVs
using a conservative detection threshold of 0.4. For Samsung IoT
devices, we show how many of them are Samsung TVs. Again, the
number of subscriber lines with such IoT devices is quite constant
across days. As expected, the specialized devices only account for
a fraction of the devices of both manufacturers.
Subscriber lines churn. While the ISP’s overall churn of sub-
scriber line identier is prey low, some changes are possible and
may bias our results. Possible reasons for such changes are: un-
plugging/rebooting of the home router, regional outages, or daily
re-assignment of IPs for privacy reasons. Yet, as most IoT devices
are detectable within a day (recall Section 5), the churn should not
bias our results. Still, to check for such artifacts, we move to larger
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time windows: see the upper panel of Figure , which plots the
cumulative number of subscriber lines with detected Alexa Enabled
and Samsung IoT devices, respectively, for up to two weeks. Here,
we see that the fractions increase. However, we may have substan-
tial double counting due to identier rotation. To underline this
conclusion, we consider penetration at the /24 prex aggregation
level, see the lower panel in Figure . e penetration lines stabi-
lize smoothly, but at dierent levels and with dierent speed. e
laer is related to the popularity of an IoT device. If it is already
popular, the likelihood of moving from a known to an unknown
subscriber line identier is lower with respect to less popular IoT
devices.
Detecting other IoT devices in-the-wild. Figure 14 reports the
detected number of the IoT devices that are neither Alexa Enabled
nor Samsung IoT. We report them using a heatmap, where each
column corresponds to a day and each row to an IoT device anno-
tated with its detection level. e color of each entry shows the
number of subscribers lines during that day. Our rst observation
is that the number of subscriber lines for each device class is very
stable across the duration of our study. Next, we point out that
our experiments include popular devices from both the European
as well as the US market. For a reference, we report the relative
popularity of each IoT device in the Amazon ranking for that de-
vice, in the country where the ISP operates. If a ranking of a device
is not available, we categorize them as “other.” Popular devices
are more prominent than unpopular ones or the ones that are not
available in the country’s market. For example, on the one hand
there are Philips devices that are popular and in heavy use with
more than 100 K subscription lines on a daily basis. On the other
hand there is Microseven camera that is not in the country’s market.
Yet, we can still observe some deployments, these results highlight
that our methodology is able to detect both popular and unpopular
IoT devices when the domains and associated service IPs that IoT
devices visit can be extracted.
6.3 Vantage Point: IXP
Next, we apply our detection methodology at the IXP vantage
point. Here, we have to tackle a few additional challenges: First,
the sampling rate at the IXP is an order of magnitude lower than at
the ISP. Second, the vantage point is in the middle of the network,
which means that we have to deal with routing asymmetry and
partial visibility of the routes. ird, while the ISP does aggressive
spoong prevention, e.g., with reverse path ltering, this is not
possible at the IXP. Spoong prevention is the responsibility of
individual IXP members. us, we require TCP trac to see at
least one packet without ags, indicating that a TCP connection
was successfully established. While this may reduce visibility, it
prevents us from over-estimating the presence of IoT trac.
While the IXP oers network connectivity for every ASes, only
a few member ASes are large eyeballs [29]. It is not that surprising
that we did not observe any activity of the ground truth experiment,
recall Section 3. Still, we are able to detect signicant IoT activity.
Figure 15 shows the number of IPs for which we detected IoT
activity per day for our two-week study period (November 15-28).
We are able to detect roughly 90k Samsung devices, 200k Alexa
Enabled devices, and more than 100k of other IoT devices. is
underlines that our methodology, which is based on domains and
generalized observations from a single subscriber line, is successful.
Most IXP members are non-eyeball networks. As such, we expect
that the detected IoT activity is concentrated on these members.
Figure 16 shows an ECDF of the distribution of IoT activity per
AS for one day (November 15, 2019) and three IoT device types,
namely, Samsung IoT, Alexa Enabled, and the other IoT devices. e
distributions are all skewed—a small number of member ASes are
responsible for a large fraction of the IoT activity. Manual checks
showed that these are all eyeball ASes. Yet, we also see a fairly long
tail. is underlines that some IoT devices may not only be used at
home (and, thus, send their trac via a non-eyeball AS).
7 DISCUSSION
7.1 Device Usage Detection
A natural question is whether sampled ow data also allows one
to distinguish if an IoT device is in active use. Our results indicate
that the answer is positive. First, our ground truth experiments
show that for some devices, the domain sets used during the idle
experiments dier from those during active experiments. Hence we
can use these domains to determine the mode (active/idle) of an IoT
device. Second, the amount of trac also varies depending on the
mode. To highlight this, Figure 17 shows the number of observed
packets at the Home-VP for a single Alexa Enabled device, as well
as the ISP-VP for both modes. Activities cause spikes above 1K at
IMC ’20, October 27–29, 2020, Pisburgh, PA, USA Saidi et al.
lllllllllllllllll
l
ll
l
lllll
lll
llllllllllllllll
l
l
l
ll
l
llllllllll
l
lllllll
l
lllllllllll
lllllllllllllll llllllllllllllllll
lllllll
l
lllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll
l
l
Active Experiment Idle Experiment
Nov 1
5
Nov 1
6
Nov 1
7
Nov 1
8
Nov 1
9
Nov 2
2
Nov 2
3
Nov 2
4
Nov 2
5
1
10
100
1k
10k
Pa
ck
e
t C
ou
nt
 P
e
r 
H
ou
r(lo
g1
0)
Vantage Point l Home VP ISP VP
Figure 17: Home-VP/GT Household: Single Alexa Enabled device.
l l l l l l l
1k
10k
100k
1m
Nov−
22
Nov−
23
Nov−
24
Nov−
25
Nov−
26
Nov−
27
Nov−
28
# 
Un
iq
ue
 S
ub
sc
rib
er
s 
(lo
g1
0)
Granularity &
Device State
l Daily: Active and Idle
Hourly: Active and Idle
Hourly: Active
Figure 18: ISP: # Subscribers with active Alexa Enabled/hour.
the home vantage points and above 10 at the ISP-VP. ese ranges
are never reached during the idle experiments.
When using the rst insight for, e.g., devices from TP-link (TP-
link Dev.), we are able to capture active use for only 3.5% of the
devices. e reason is that these are plugs, which have a total trac
volume so low that it limits the detectability due to the low sampling
rate at the ISP. When using the second insight for Alexa Enabled
devices, we nd that we can detect signicant activity. Figure 18
shows both the subscriber lines with Alexa-enabled devices per
hour, per day as well as the subscriber lines with active Alexa-
enabled devices. Based on the above-mentioned observations, we
used the threshold of 10 for packet counts per hour to lter out
subscribers that actively used Alexa-enabled devices in a given hour.
Based on this threshold, we see that the number of actively used
devices reaches 27,000 during the day and weekends (Nov. 23-24),
following the diurnal paern of human activity.
e ability to distinguish active from idle usage of IoT devices in
the wild may raise ethical/privacy concerns. However, the goal of
this paper is not to analyze user behavior, but rather to point out
the privacy concerns associated with having these IoT devices at
home [3].
7.2 Potential Security Benets
e ability to detect IoT services can be used in a constructive
manner or even as a service by ISPs. For example, if there are
known security problems with an IoT device, the ISP/IXP can block
access to certain domains/IP ranges or redirect their trac to benign
servers. e methodology can also be used for troubleshooting,
incident investigation, and even incident resolution. For example,
an ISP can use our methodology for redirecting the IoT devices
trac to a new backend infrastructure that oers privacy notices or
security patches for devices that are no longer supported by their
manufacturers.
Moreover, if an IoT device is misbehaving, e.g., if it is involved
in network aacks or part of a botnet [30], our methodology can
help the ISP/IXP in identifying what devices are common among
the subscriber lines with suspicious trac. Once identied, their
owner can be notied in a similar manner, as suggested by [31],
and it may be possible to block the aack or the botnet control
trac [32].
7.3 Limitations
Our methodology has some limitations.
Sample devices. We need to have sample devices in order to
observe which domains are being contacted.
Superclass detection. We mostly check for false negatives and
limitedly for false positives as we only have trac samples from a
subset of IoT devices, but not for all possible IoT devices. If an IoT
device relies on a shared backend infrastructure or common IoT
APIs, we only detect the superclass, e.g., at the manufacturer level.
Network activity. We rely on the network activity of IoT devices.
As such, if the trac volume is very low detectability decreases,
and detection time increases.
Shared infrastructures. We cannot detect IoT services that rely
on shared infrastructures. If the IoT devices change their backend
infrastructure, e.g., aer an update, we may have to update our
detection rules too.
7.4 Lessons Learned
Our analysis could be simplied if an ISP/IXP had access to all DNS
queries and responses. Even having a partial list, e.g., from the local
DNS resolver of the ISP, could improve our methodology. Yet, this
raises many privacy challenges. An increasing number of end-users
rely on technologies like DNS over TLS, or public DNS resolvers,
e.g., google-dns, open-dns, or cloudare-dns, rather than the local
ISP DNS server. Yet, this also points to another potential privacy
issue—the global data collection and analysis engines at these DNS
operators, which can identify IoT devices at scale from the recorded
DNS logs using our insights. Capturing DNS data from the network
itself would require deep packet inspection and thus, specialized
packet capture, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
e subscriber or device detection speed varies depending not
only on the device and its trac intensity, but also on the trac
capture sampling rates. e lower this rate, the more time it may
take to detect a specic IoT device. Moreover, identifying the rele-
vant domains for each IoT device does require sanitization, which
may involve manual work, e.g., studying manuals, device docu-
mentation, vendor web sites, or even programming APIs. Given
that we are unable to identify IoT services if they are using shared
infrastructures (e.g., CDNs), this also points out a good way to hide
IoT services.
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8 RELATEDWORK
ere have been some recent papers in understanding home IoT
trac paerns and identifying devices based on their signatures,
trackers, and network trac [33]. ese approaches oen rely on
testbed data [4, 34], or tools for the active discovery of the household
devices and their network trac [35]. e authors in [34] use a
broad range of network features from packet captures, including
domain names to train a machine learning model and detect IoT
devices in a lab environment. However, they do not further study
the backend infrastructure supporting IoT devices. ere have
also been a few early aempts at mitigating against these device
discoveries using trac padding [36] or blocking techniques [32].
A number of recent eorts focused on inferring IoT device types
from network trac [6, 37]. In [15] the authors used instrumented
home gateways to look at IoT traces from over 200 households
in a US city. eir analysis revealed that while the IoT space is
fragmented, few popular cloud and DNS services act as a central
hub for the majority of the devices and their data.
Complementing the approaches based on testbeds and home
gateways, there have been eorts in understanding IoT trac pat-
terns using data from transit networks [38], though it has been
challenging to successfully validate the derived signatures. Similar
works relied on specic port numbers [39] that may also be used
for specialized industrial IoT systems [40], though the approach
used cannot be easily extended to general-purpose IoT devices and
smart home systems that utilize popular ports, e.g., 443, 80.
ese related works indicate that oen, neither data from core
networks subject to sampling and middleboxes, nor data from few
devices using home gateways or testbeds are enough for rapidly and
accurately detecting IoT devices, and understanding their anomalies
and miscongurations [10].
In this paper, for the rst time we have complemented detailed
ground truth data from testbeds and a particular subscriber, with
large-scale data from an ISP and an IXP, to reveal the aggregate be-
havior of these devices, alongside the ability to isolate and identify
specic subscriber devices using sampled data at an ISP.
9 CONCLUSION
Home IoT devices are already popular, and their usage is expected
to grow further. us, we need to track their deployment without
deep packet inspection or active measurements, both intrusive and
unscalable methods for large deployments. Our insight is that
many IoT devices contact a small number of domains, and, thus, it
is possible to detect such devices at scale from sampled network
ow measurements in very large networks, even when they are in
idle mode. We show that our method is able to detect millions of
such devices in a large ISP and in an IXP that connects hundreds of
networks.
Our technique is able to detect 5 IoT platforms, 20 manufacturers
and 11 products–both popular and less popular ones–at vendor level
and in many cases even at product granularity. While this detection
may be useful to understand the penetration of IoT devices at home,
it raises concerns about the general detectability of such devices
and the corresponding human activity.
In light of our alarming observations, as part of our future work,
we would like to investigate how to minimize the harm of potential
aacks and surveillance using IoT devices. We also want to use our
insights to help ISPs to tackle security and performance problems
caused by IoT devices, e.g., by detecting them, redirecting their
trac, or blocking their trac.
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